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ABSTRACT
The Article takes a fresh look at the definition of crimes against
humanity and its applicability in the International Criminal Court
(“ICC”) by analyzing the ICC Prosecutor’s decision not to proceed
with the investigation of the Maydan crimes in Ukraine, based on her
evaluation of the “widespread or systematic” requirement. It argues
that the ICC Prosecutor did not correctly apply the systematic require-
ment of crimes against humanity to the factual circumstances sur-
rounding the Maydan events that were supportive of the requirement.
The ICC Prosecutor’s finding appears to stem from the lack of clarity
in International Criminal Law as to how the systematic requirement is
applied on a stand-alone basis as well as how it interacts with the pol-
icy element. By deciding not to forward with the investigation into the
situation of Ukraine, the ICC Prosecutor denied the judges an oppor-
tunity to decide whether the Maydan crimes would satisfy the system-
* I would like to thank Professor Elies van Sliedregt for her encouragement and
comments on the early draft of my article.
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atic requirement of crimes against humanity despite its earlier finding
on the existence of a State policy, which serves as an important indica-
tor of the systematic requirement. This Article criticizes the ICC Pros-
ecutor’s overly narrow approach towards the interpretation of a
“widespread or systematic” attack in the context of crimes against
humanity and analyzes implications the prosecutorial discretion of not
requesting the authorization of the investigation in Ukraine may have
for the future direction of the Court with respect to the interpretation
of crimes against humanity.
I. INTRODUCTION
This article re-examines the conceptual definition of crimes against
humanity and its applicability in the International Criminal Court
(“ICC”) in light of the recent ICC Prosecutor’s interpretation of crimes
against humanity at the stage of its preliminary examination of the
Maydan1 crimes in Ukraine. It highlights uncertainty in the applicability
of the requirement of a “widespread or systematic” attack and how it
interacts with the element of a “state or organizational policy” in the con-
text of crimes against humanity. This article argues that the disjunctive
test of “widespread or systematic” in International Criminal Law does
not work well, as judging by the developed jurisprudence, it entails that
both characteristics of the attack are in fact present or at least the wide-
spread dimension is overwhelmingly convincing. International criminal
courts have not developed a practice for the prosecution of crimes against
humanity based on the presence of the systematic requirement alone. The
very absence of such a precedent somewhat explains the outcome of the
situation in Ukraine, where the ICC Prosecutor decided not to proceed
with the investigation of the Maydan crimes on the basis that the attack
during which the alleged crimes against humanity occurred was not sys-
tematic. The ICC Prosecutor reached this conclusion during its prelimi-
nary examination of the situation in Ukraine, acting upon the Ukraine’s
declaration on the ad hoc jurisdiction acceptance with respect to the
Maydan crimes. This article criticizes the ICC Prosecutor’s overly narrow
approach towards the interpretation of a “widespread or systematic”
attack in the context of crimes against humanity. It argues that the Prose-
cutor misinterpreted the factual circumstances, which are indicative of the
systematic dimension of the attack, and analyzes implications the
prosecutorial discretion of not requesting the authorization of the investi-
gation in Ukraine may have for the future direction of the Court with
respect to the interpretation of crimes against humanity.
1 Maydan crimes refer to the crimes committed in the context of public protests
against the anti-EU policies of the former Ukrainian government that took place in
the capital of Ukraine, mostly concentrated at the Maydan Nezalezhnosti square, in
period between November 2013 and February 2014.
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This article will begin by providing a brief overview of the events lead-
ing up to the Maydan crimes and the Ukraine’s acceptance of the ICC’s
ad hoc jurisdiction. It will focus on the ICC Prosecutor’s evaluation of a
“widespread or systematic attack” in relation to the Maydan crimes in
deciding whether to proceed with the investigation into the situation in
Ukraine. Initially, the article will situate the ICC Prosecutor’s findings on
crimes against humanity in Ukraine in a broader debate on the concep-
tual understanding of crimes against humanity in International Criminal
Law. In order to illustrate uncertainty in the applicability of the require-
ment of a “widespread or systematic” attack in the context of crimes
against humanity, the article will examine the evolution of this require-
ment from Nuremberg to the ICC. The subsequent parts of this article
will explore how the ICC has construed the “widespread or systematic”
requirement in similar situations based solely on the charges of crimes
against humanity appearing before the Court. Ultimately, this article will
argue that the ICC Prosecutor’s finding of the absence of crimes against
humanity during the Maydan protests was flawed, since the alleged
crimes appear to have satisfied the systematic requirement of the disjunc-
tive test for crimes against humanity as set out in the Rome Statute.
II. MAYDAN CRIMES AND THE ICC
The first section of the Article provides a brief overview of the events
during the Maydan protests that led the Ukrainian government to accept
the jurisdiction of the ICC under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute for
the alleged crimes against humanity. It also details the steps undertaken
by the ICC Prosecutor with respect to the preliminary examination of the
Maydan crimes and lays the groundwork for the subsequent discussion as
to how the Office of the Prosecutor’s (“OTP”) report on the absence of
crimes against humanity during the Maydan protests may influence our
understanding of the concept of crimes against humanity in International
Criminal Law.
The Maydan protests, which lasted from November 2013 until February
2014, were sparked by the unpopular decision of the former President of
Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, not to sign the association agreement with
the European Union.2 Following his decision, peaceful protests
descended into confrontations between the Ukrainian security forces and
demonstrators.3 The situation began to spiral out of control with the
adoption of controversial laws on January 16, 2014, commonly known as
dictatorship laws, which imposed restrictions on freedom of assembly and
2 See Ukraine protests after Yanukovych EU deal rejection, BBC NEWS (Mar. 1,
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25162563.
3 See id; see also UNHCR, REP. ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN UKRAINE, ¶
56-58 (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/ENACARegion/Pages/
UAReports.aspx.
\\jciprod01\productn\B\BIN\35-1\BIN102.txt unknown Seq: 4  7-FEB-17 12:59
42 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:39
freedom of expression.4 Following this, violent clashes between demon-
strators and security forces escalated into the peak of violence on Febru-
ary 18, 2014, which resulted in the death of around one hundred
demonstrators and hundreds of injuries.5 In a desperate attempt to calm
the situation, Yanukovych reached an agreement with opposition leaders
on a new government and early presidential elections scheduled for May
2014.6 This decision infuriated the public, which was appalled by the kill-
ing of demonstrators and demanded the resignation of the President with
immediate effect.7 Claiming that he feared for his life, Yanukovych fled
the country to neighboring Russia.8
As Ukraine was effectively left without a president, the Ukrainian par-
liament, Verkhovna Rada, passed a resolution on self-withdrawal of Pres-
ident Yanukovych from his constitutional duties.9 The chairperson of
Verkhovna Rada, Oleksandr Turchynov, assumed responsibilities as ex
4 Pro vnesennya zmin do Zakonu Ukrayiny “Pro sudoustrij i status suddiv” ta
procesualnyx zakoniv shchodo dodatkovyx zaxodiv zaxystu bezpeky hromadyan [On
Amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On the Judicial System and Status of Judges”
and procedural laws regarding additional measures to protect the safety of citizens]
[Law of Ukraine] Jan. 16, 2014, No. 721-VII, http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/721-
18, translated in https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/Display
DCTMContent?documentId=09000016802efb7f.
5 The number of casualties provided by various sources differs and fluctuates
between seventy-five and one hundred persons killed during the protests. Register of
Proceedings of Crimes During the Revolution of Dignity, GENERAL PROSECUTOR OF
UKRAINE (Jan. 22, 2014), http://rrg.gp.gov.ua/reestr-kriminalnih-provadzhen/golovne-
slidche-upravlinnja-generalnoi-prokuraturi-ukraini/storinka-1/ (stating that during the
protests seventy-seven civilians were killed, around 2 hundred civilians sustained
gunshots wounds and more than 1 thousand civilians received injuries of various
gravity).
6 Hannah Strange, Ukraine crisis: Viktor Yanukovych denounces ‘coup’ as he




8 Following Yanukovych’s escape to Russia, he held a press conference in Rostov,
during which he asserted his position as a legitimately elected president of Ukraine.
See News of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych Press Conference in Rostov 11 03 14,
YOUTUBE (Mar. 11, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uR8IPqVYd84.
9 See Pro samousunennya Prezydenta Ukrayiny vid vykonannya konstytucijnyx
povnovazhen ta pryznachennya pozacherhovyx vyboriv Prezydenta Ukrayiny
[Resolution of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine On Self-Withdrawal of the President of
Ukraine from Performing His Constitutional Duties and Scheduling Early Elections
of the President of Ukraine] (Feb. 22, 2014), http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/757-
18.
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officio Head of State until the election of the new president, Petro
Poroshenko, in May 2014.10
States that have not ratified the Rome Statute have occasionally sought
the ICC’s help to address ongoing situations of violence by lodging the
declaration under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute. As an example,
both Coˆte d’Ivoire and Palestine invoked Article 12(3) in order to submit
to the jurisdiction of the ICC.11 The “beauty” of the ad hoc jurisdiction
acceptance mechanism is that it may be invoked by a non-state party to
the Rome Statute that chooses to refer the situation to the ICC because it
is incapable of dealing with the prosecution of the crimes that would oth-
erwise fall within the jurisdiction of the Court.12 The jurisdiction trig-
gered by lodging the declaration also entitles the ICC to exercise its
jurisdiction retroactively, that is, in relation to the crimes that have been
committed.13 Despite being a signatory to the Rome Statute, Ukraine has
not ratified it.14 The Constitutional Court of Ukraine stalled the ratifica-
tion process by finding that the ICC’s principle of complementarity was
contrary to the Constitution of Ukraine’s provision granting exclusive
judicial competence to Ukrainian courts.15 Ultimately, the Ukrainian
10 See generally Konstytuciya Ukrayiny, art. 112 (providing that in the event of
early termination of the presidential duties, the chairperson of Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine acts as ex officio Head of State until the elections of a new president); Shaun
Walker and Alex Luhn, Petro Poroshenko wins presidency, according to exit polls,
GUARDIAN (May 25, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/25/petro-
poroshenko-ukraine-president-wins-election.
11 See Coˆte d’Ivoire, De´claration de Reconnaissance de la Compe´tence de la Cour
Pe´nale Internationale, ICC (Apr. 18, 2003), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/
FF9939C2-8E97-4463-934C-BC8F351BA013/279779/ICDE1.pdf) [hereinafter Coˆte
d’Ivoire Declaration]; see also Palestine, Declaration Recognizing the Jurisdiction of
the International Criminal Court, ICC (Jan. 21, 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/
rdonlyres/7CFB4B01-0B7E-4590-A8A8-7863E516F0A3/279777/20090122Palestinian
Declaration7.pdf.
12 INT’L CRIM. CT., Understanding the International Criminal Court 5, https://www
.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/UICCEng.pdf.
13 Id.
14 Ukraine signed the Rome Statute on January 20, 2000. All the ratification
attempts have thus far been unsuccessful. For more see Iryna Marchuk, Ukraine and
the International Criminal Court: Implications of the Ad Hoc Jurisdiction Acceptance
and Beyond, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 323, 326 (2016).
15 See id. at 326-37; see also Konstytucijnyj Sud Ukrayiny Vysnovok
Konstytucijnoho Sudu Ukrayiny u spravi za konstytucijnym podannyam Prezydenta
Ukrayiny pro nadannya vysnovku shhodo vidpovidnosti Konstytuciyi Ukrayiny
Rymskoho Statutu Mizhnarodnoho kryminal noho sudu, [Ruling on the Submission of
the President of Ukraine Regarding Conformity of the Constitution of Ukraine with
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court] No. UKR-2001-2-001 (July 11,
2001), http://www.ccu.gov.ua/en/docs/295.
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interim government accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC with respect to
the Maydan events by lodging the declaration under Article 12(3).16
In reaction to the public outcry in the aftermath of the Maydan vio-
lence, the Ukrainian parliament accepted the ad hoc jurisdiction of the
ICC under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute with respect to the Maydan
events.17 In its Declaration, the parliament alleged that the Ukrainian
senior government officials committed crimes against humanity through
authorizing and condoning the violence unleashed by the Ukrainian
security forces against demonstrators.18 Nearly three months passed
before Ukraine officially lodged its declaration accepting the ad hoc juris-
diction of the ICC with the ICC Registrar.19 In its press release, the ICC
acknowledged the receipt of Ukraine’s declaration and relayed it for fur-
ther consideration by the OTP.20
The ICC Prosecutor took one-and-a-half years to decide whether to
seek the Pre-Trial Chamber’s authorization to initiate an investigation
into the situation.21 In deciding whether a reasonable basis exists for initi-
ating an investigation, the ICC Prosecutor follows a three-prong test laid
down in Article 53(1) of the Rome Statute.22 In its report on preliminary
investigation activities, the ICC Prosecutor limited her legal analysis with
respect to the Maydan events to the determination of whether “the
crimes allegedly committed during the Maydan protests events may
16 Declaration of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, No. 790-VII, Feb. 25, 2014
[hereinafter Declaration I]. On Sept. 8, 2015, Ukraine lodged yet another declaration
accepting the ad hoc jurisdiction of the ICC with respect to alleged crimes committed
in eastern Ukraine and Crimea since 20 February 2014. See e.g., Declaration of
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, No 145-VIII, Feb. 4, 2015 [hereinafter Declaration II];
see Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., Ukraine Accepts the ICC Jurisdiction Over Alleged
Crimes Committed Between 21 November 2013 and 22 February 2014, ICC-CPI-
20140417-PR997 (Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/
press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/pr997.aspx.
17 See Declaration I, supra note 16. R
18 Id.; see generally Embassy of Ukraine, No. 61219/35-673-384 (Registrar, Int’l
Crim. Ct. Apr. 9, 2014) https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/997/declarationRecog
nitionJuristiction09-04-2014.pdf.
19 See Press Release, Int’l Crim. Ct., supra note 16. R
20 Id.
21 See INT’L CRIM. CT. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, REPORT ON PRELIMINARY
EXAMINATION ACTIVITIES (2015) 18, ¶ 77-79 (Nov. 12, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/otp/OTP-PE-rep-2015-Eng.pdf [hereinafter OTP REPORT].
22 According to Article 53(1)(a)–(c), The ICC Prosecutor shall consider whether
“(a) the information available . . . provides a reasonable basis to believe that a crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is been committed; (b) the case is or
would be inadmissible under Article 17 of the Statute; and (c) taking into account the
gravity of the crime and the interests of justice.” Rome Statute of the Int’l Crim. Ct.
art. 53, ¶ 1, July 17, 1998, A/CONF.183/9. The author argues elsewhere that the test
laid down in Article 53(1)(a)-(c) with respect to the evaluation of the Maydan crimes
has been met. See Marchuk, supra note 14, at 347. R
\\jciprod01\productn\B\BIN\35-1\BIN102.txt unknown Seq: 7  7-FEB-17 12:59
2017] NO CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 45
amount to crimes against humanity under article 7 of the Statute.”23 The
thrust of the Prosecutor’s argument is that the attack during which the
Maydan crimes took place was neither widespread nor systematic.24
Given the Prosecutor’s evaluation on the absence of a “widespread or
systematic” attack during the Maydan protests, she concluded that the
alleged crimes did not constitute crimes against humanity.25
Despite the test of “widespread or systematic” being disjunctive, there
seems to exist a presumption in the work of international criminal courts
that both dimensions of the attack have to be present in order for the
Prosecutor to move forward with the investigation. The very absence of
any precedent in the work of international criminal courts—when the
Prosecutor decided to go forward with the investigation on the basis that
the attack during which the crimes against humanity occurred was solely
systematic—was largely to blame for the outcome in the situation of
Ukraine.  By illustrating how the requirement of a “widespread or sys-
tematic” attack was applied in the situation of Ukraine, and other situa-
tions, the author hopes to reinvigorate the debate on the conceptual
definition of crimes against humanity and its applicability in International
Criminal Law.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF A WIDESPREAD OR SYSTEMATIC
REQUIREMENT IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
FROM NUREMBERG TO THE ICC
The “widespread or systematic” requirement for crimes against human-
ity is traced to the Nuremberg Tribunal, which prosecuted Nazi leader-
ship in the aftermath of World War II.26 This was the first time that
crimes against humanity were featured as a distinct category of interna-
tional crimes and enforced by a tribunal of an international character.27
However, the Nuremberg Charter did not provide a comprehensive defi-
nition of crimes against humanity, but instead merely listed underlying
acts that would qualify as crimes against humanity only if they were com-
mitted in execution of or in connection with any other crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal (“war crimes nexus”).28 The “widespread or
systematic” requirement is glaringly absent from this definition of crimes
against humanity. The International Law Commission (“ILC”) noted that
23 OTP REPORT, supra note 21, at 89. R
24 Id. at 95.
25 See id. at 101.
26 U.N. Secretary-General, The Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal
- History and Analysis, at 75, A/CN.4/5, [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter].
27 See id. at 92-3 (listing the following crimes as crimes against humanity: “. . .
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, other inhumane acts committed
against civilian population . . . persecutions on political, racial or religious
grounds. . .”).
28 Id.
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despite such absence, the existence of the requirement was implied, as the
Tribunal, in considering whether certain acts constituted crimes against
humanity, paid attention to the vast scale, as well as the systematic and
organized nature of the policy of terror in which the crimes were
committed.29
In its 1991 Draft Code, the ILC termed crimes against humanity as
“systematic or mass violations of human rights.”30 The two disjunctive
terms were added to signal that the Draft Code covered only acts of an
extremely serious character.31 The “systematic” element was described
through “a constant practice or to a methodical plan to carry out such
violations,” whereas the “mass-scale” element was employed in relation
“to the number of people affected by such violations or the entity that has
been affected.”32 It also made clear that the proof of either one of those
disjunctive terms was sufficient.33 The commentary recognized that the
systematic or mass-scale dimension of the crimes was closely linked to a
policy to commit such crimes designed either by public officials who have
“factual opportunity to commit the crimes” or by private individuals
“with de facto power or organized in criminal gangs or groups.”34
Several years later, the 1996 Draft Code further developed the defini-
tion of crimes against humanity, providing that they must be “committed
in a systematic nature or on a large scale instigated or directed by a gov-
ernment or by any organization or group.”35 It is clear from the wording
that the “large scale” and “systematic” requirements were used in the
alternative. The commentary to the 1996 Draft Code explicates that “on a
large scale” requirement means that “the acts are directed against a mul-
tiplicity of victims,” and serves as a filter to exclude an isolated inhuman
act to be considered as a crime against humanity.36 The “systematic
nature” requirement means that the acts are committed “pursuant to a
preconceived plan or policy.”37 This was introduced to exclude any ran-
29 Int’l Law Comm’n, REP. ON THE WORK OF ITS FORTY-EIGHTH SESSION, U.N.
GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 47, ¶ 3, U.N. DOC. A/51/10; (1996), [hereinafter
REP. ON FORTY-EIGHTH SESSION]; IMT, The Trial of German Major War Criminals:
Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg (Nuremberg
Judgment), Germany, 1 October 1946, PART: The Law Relating to War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judlawre.asp
(retrieved 1 March 2016) (finding that “the policy of terror was certainly carried out
on a vast scale, and in many cases was organized and systematic” (emphasis added)).
30 Int’l Law Comm’n, REP. ON THE WORK OF ITS FORTY-THIRD SESSION, U.N.





35 REP. ON FORTY-EIGHTH SESSION, supra note 29, at 47. R
36 Id.
37 Id. at ¶ 4.
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dom acts, which were not committed as a part of a broader plan or pol-
icy.38 Although the interpretation of both qualifiers is similar to that
featured in the 1991 Draft Code, it is necessary to note that the term
“systematic” was defined as the existence of a policy advanced by a state
or any other group.39 In other words, the proof of the existence of a pol-
icy to commit any underlying acts listed in the Draft Code was sufficient
to qualify the acts as crimes against humanity.
The UN Commission of Experts elaborated on the “widespread or sys-
tematic” requirement attached to crimes against humanity in its report to
the Secretary-General on the existence of serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.40 It
noted that that crimes against humanity “must be carried out in a system-
atic way or by means of a mass action.”41 The test was construed as
involving a “high number of victims and perpetrators” and the existence
of a “common plan” masterminded by perpetrators.42 Although the terms
“systematic” and “mass action” are used in the alternative, one does have
an impression that, in fact, the two elements were used as a cumulative
characteristic of the attack within the meaning of crimes against human-
ity. This is evident from the committee’s conclusion: “it is the overall con-
text of large-scale victimization carried out as part of a common plan or
design which goes to the element of systematicity.”43 The report high-
lights the significance of crimes against humanity due to “the abhorrent
character of the overall policy, the means employed to carry out the pol-
icy and the number of victims it produces.”44  Although the policy ele-
ment was not singled out as a separate element of crimes against
humanity, it is clear that it was embedded in the element of systematicity.
While the statute of the International Tribunal for the former Yugosla-
via (“ICTY”) does not explicitly provide for the widespread or systematic
requirement in the definition of crimes against humanity, the existence of
the requirement was affirmed in the early jurisprudence of the ICTY in
its pivotal Tadic case.45 Interestingly, the Prosecution and the Defense
were in disagreement as to whether the “widespread or systematic” test
was conjunctive or disjunctive.46 The Prosecutor submitted that the attack
against the civilian population was meant to be widespread or systematic,
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 REP. OF THE COMM’N OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780, ¶ 84, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (May 27, 1994) [hereinafter -




44 Id at ¶ 86.
45 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶ 646 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997).
46 See id. at ¶ 645
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whereas the Defense argued that the test required both elements to be in
place.47 The Trial Chamber agreed with the Prosecution, holding that it
was well established that the acts directed against a civilian population
can only be considered crimes against humanity if they occur on a wide-
spread basis or in a systematic manner.48 It substantiated its conclusion
that both terms are used in the alternative by referring to the Report of
the Secretary-General, the report of the ad hoc committee on the estab-
lishment of a permanent International Criminal Court, the ILC Draft
Codes, and the Vukovar Hospital decision.49 The Trial Chamber noted a
discrepancy as to how those two terms had been used, in particular in the
working documents of the ILC. However, it concluded that the prevailing
opinion was that those two terms were used in the alternative, which it
confirmed was also applicable in the ICTY.50
In its Akayesu case, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(“ICTR”) Trial Chamber also upheld the disjunctive test of “widespread
or systematic.” It noted, however, that in the original French version of
the ICTR Statute, the two requirements were used as cumulative terms.51
In that respect, the Trial Chamber reinstated that the test in customary
international law was disjunctive and attributed the cumulative use of
terms to the translation error.52 The “widespread” requirement was
defined as “massive, frequent, large-scale action, carried out collectively
with considerable seriousness and directed against the multiplicity of vic-
tims.”53 The concept of “systematic” was defined as “thoroughly organ-
ized and following a regular pattern on the basis of a common policy
involving substantial public or private resources.”54 The Trial Chamber
further clarified that although the policy was not confined to a formal
state policy, some kind of preconceived plan or policy must be present.55
The ICTY has construed the widespread or systematic test in a similar
fashion. The ICTY Appeals Chamber re-affirmed that the term “wide-
spread” referred to “the large-scale nature of the attack and the number
of targeted persons,” whereas the term “systematic” referred to “the
organized nature of the acts of violence and the improbability of their
random occurrence.”56 The Appeals Chamber held that patterns of
crimes, which manifest themselves in the non-accidental repetition of
47 Id. at ¶ 645.
48 Id.
49 See id. at ¶ 646-47.
50 Id. at ¶ 647.
51 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 579, fn. 144
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 2, 1998).
52 Id.
53 Id. at ¶ 580.
54 Id.
55 Id. at ¶ 580; see also REP. ON FORTY-EIGHTH SESSION, supra note 29, at 94. R
56 Prosecutor v. Blas˘kic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 101 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004) (citing Prosecutor v. Kunarac,
\\jciprod01\productn\B\BIN\35-1\BIN102.txt unknown Seq: 11  7-FEB-17 12:59
2017] NO CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 49
similar criminal conduct on a regular basis, constitute a common expres-
sion of systematic occurrence.57 The ICTY further defines that the “sys-
tematic” element of crimes against humanity may be expressed through:
(i) a political objective or plan, (ii) large-scale or the repeated and contin-
uous commission of crimes which are linked, (iii) use of significant public
or private resources, and (iv) the implication of high-level political or mil-
itary authorities.58
Although at first glance the characteristics pertinent to a systematic
attack seem to resonate with those outlined by the Akayesu Trial Cham-
ber, there are some notable differences. The ICTR defines systematicity
through the existence of a policy, whereas the ICTY does it through the
existence of a political objective or a plan as well as the implication of
political or military leadership. It is also clear from the ICTY definition
that it defines “systematic” through the continuous and repeated commis-
sion of crimes rather than the level of organization as appears in Akayesu.
The ICTY definition of the systematic requirement through the “large-
scale” commission of crimes is also quite confusing, as it is clearly indica-
tive of the “widespread” element. The two ad hoc tribunals are thus in
agreement about the disjunctive use of a “widespread or systematic”
requirement, although there are some differences as to characteristics of
the systematic nature of the attack.
With respect to the assessment as to what constitutes a “widespread or
systematic” attack, the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Kunarac upheld that it
is “essentially a relative exercise,” which depends upon the civilian popu-
lation that is attacked.59 More specifically, such evaluation requires the
Trial Chamber first to “identify the population which is the object of the
attack,” and then “in light of the means, methods, resources and result of
the attack upon the population” to ascertain whether the attack was
widespread or systematic.60 Apart from this, the Trial Chamber could also
take into the account “the consequences of the attack upon the targeted
population, the number of victims, the nature of the acts, the possible
participation of officials or authorities or any identifiable patterns of
crimes” in order to determine whether the attack satisfies either or both
requirements of a “widespread or systematic” attack.61
Interestingly, the Appeals Chamber does not distinguish how to evalu-
ate the “widespread or systematic” dimensions of the attack separately.
Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 94 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia June 12, 2002)).
57 Id. at ¶ 101.
58 Prosecutor v. Blas˘kic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 203 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia March 3, 2000).
59 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Appeal Judgment ¶
95 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002).
60 Id. (citing trial judgement).
61 Id.
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The test appears to be uniform and equally applies to both characteristics
of the attack. The judges may have chosen to formulate the applicable
uniform test for evaluating the “widespread or systematic” requirement
since there was no need to elaborate in greater depth how to evaluate
those two characteristics separately. It is commonly known that the vio-
lence in the former Yugoslavia was of large-scale and organized nature
and therefore satisfied both characteristics within the meaning of crimes
against humanity. The two dimensions of the attack were also easy to
prove with respect to the violence fueled by ethnic hatred in Rwanda.
While the absence of a clearly formulated test for assessing the “wide-
spread or systematic” requirement did not prove to be a major issue in
the practice of the ad hoc tribunals, it has generally created uncertainty as
to the application of the requirement in different situations when the
existence of both elements of the attack is not as straightforward as in the
situations in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The article will attempt
to demonstrate that the ICC Prosecutor has been confronted with that
challenge in the situation in Ukraine, and will argue that the “widespread
or systematic” test was wrongly construed and applied.
A. The Widespread or Systematic Requirement in the ICC
The Rome Statute provides that crimes against humanity must be com-
mitted as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any
civilian population.62 Although the Statute uses both terms in the alterna-
tive similar to the practices of the ad hoc tribunals, the use of terms was
subject to discussion during drafting of the Rome Statute.63 The drafters
were divided into two major groups: one of them campaigning for the
disjunctive test of “widespread or systematic” and another one favoring
the conjunctive test of “widespread and systematic.”64 The proponents of
the disjunctive test referred to the developed practices of the ad hoc
tribunals.65
62 Rome Statute of the Int’l Crim. Ct. opened for signature July 17, 1988, art. 7,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90, (entered into force July 1, 2002).
63 See Darryl Robinson, Defining ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ at the Rome
Conference, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 47 (1999).
64 See id.
65 See id. at 47; see also: U.N., Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, A/CONR183/13, Summary records
of the plenary meetings and of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, Official
Records, Volume II, Rome, 15 June-17 July 1998. [hereinafter U.N. Diplomatic
Conf.]. For the positions of individual states, please consult the following paragraphs
of the summary records: Germany (¶ 21, p. 147), Czech Republic (¶ 36, p. 148), Brazil
(¶ 50, p. 148), Denmark (¶ 55, p. 149), Poland (¶ 82, p. 150), Mexico (¶ 124, p. 152),
Finland (¶130, p. 152), Spain (¶ 148, p. 153), Italy (¶ 162, p. 153), Netherlands (¶ 14 p.
155).
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The drafters who opposed the disjunctive test argued that the proof of
only one characteristic of the attack would create an over-inclusive test.66
The Indian delegate raised concerns that in case of the adoption of a dis-
junctive test, “an individual murder, for instance, would fall within the
jurisdiction of the Court.”67 The representative of Thailand submitted
that the adoption of a cumulative test was necessary to ensure that the
crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC “were of a truly serious nature
and differed from ordinary criminal offences.”68 Uruguay,69 Iran,70 Tur-
key,71 Russia,72 Sweden,73 Japan,74 and Syria75 each advanced similar
arguments, advocating for the adoption of the cumulative test.
This concern about the over-inclusiveness of the test was supposedly
remedied by the introduction of the policy requirement, which ensured
that the ICC could only prosecute the crimes committed as part of a
“state or organizational policy.”76 The delegates were, however, split on
the subject of the policy element.77 One of the most vocal opponents was
the representative of Congo, who argued that the policy element “consti-
tuted an unacceptable threshold that in no way reflected contemporary
realities or international law.”78 Taking a different stance on the issue, the
representative of Sri Lanka supported the adoption of the policy element
arguing that it was intended to cover both government and non-govern-
ment entities.79 Contrary to the practice of the ad hoc tribunals, which
treated the existence of a policy as an evidentiary matter, the drafters of
the Rome Statute singled it out as a separate element in order to ensure
that only crimes of sufficient gravity would reach the ICC.80 However,
concerns have been voiced in academia that the “widespread or system-
atic” requirement coupled with the policy element essentially turns the
disjunctive test into the conjunctive one.81
The ICC Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers re-affirmed the disjunctive use
of the terms “widespread or systematic.” Similar to the developed juris-
66 Robinson, supra note 63, at 47. R
67 U.N. Diplomatic Conf., supra note 65, at 148. R
68 Id. at 151.
69 Id. at 156.
70 Id. at 152.
71 Id. at 154.
72 Id. at 155.
73 Id. at 155.
74 Id. at 156.
75 Id. at 271.
76 Robinson, supra note 63, at 47. R
77 Id. at 48.
78 U.N. Diplomatic Conf., supra note 65, at 345. R
79 Id. at 288.
80 Robinson, supra note 63, at 48. R
81 See Margaret McAuliffe deGuzman, The Road from Rome: The Developing Law
of Crimes against Humanity, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 335, 372 (2000).
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prudence of the ad hoc tribunals, the “widespread” element has been
defined as encompassing “the large-scale nature of the attack, which
should be massive, frequent, carried out collectively with considerable
seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of victims.”82 The judges
reinforced that what matters in proving the widespread requirement is
“the large-scale nature of the attack” and “the number of resultant vic-
tims.”83 At the same time, judges made it clear that the assessment test is
“[neither] exclusively quantitative or geographical” as it must be based
on the evaluation of individual facts.84
The “systematic” requirement was defined as encompassing the
“organized nature of the acts of violence and the improbability of their
random occurrence.”85 The judges emphasized that the systematic nature
of the attack can be revealed “through the patterns of crimes, in the sense
of non-accidental repetition of similar criminal conduct on a regular
basis.”86 Further, the judges took note of how the ICTY and ICTR
defined the “systematic” requirement.87 However, the judges refrained
from elaborating what weight should be attributed to the interpretation
that was earlier offered by the ad hoc tribunals.88 This uncritical accept-
ance of various interpretations of the systematic requirement in the ad
hoc tribunals adds very little to our understanding as to how the require-
ment should be construed and applied in the ICC. While accepting the
definitions of its predecessors, the judges seem to have forgotten that the
ICC definition of crimes against humanity is somehow different since it
82 Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision Pursuant to Article 61 (7) (a)
and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre
Bemba Gombo, ¶ 83 (June 15, 2009); see also Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07,
Decision on the confirmation of charges, ¶ 395; (Sept. 30, 2008), Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, ¶ 580 (Sept. 2, 1998), Prosecutor v.
Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Appeal Judgement, ¶ 204 (Jan. 27, 2000). The
same test was endorsed by the Pre-Trial Chamber authorizing an investigation into
the situation of the Coˆte d’Ivoire. See Situation in the Republic of Cote D’Ivoire,
ICC-02/11-14, Decision Pursuant to art. 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization
of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire, ¶ 53 (Oct. 3,
2011) [hereinafter Coˆte d’Ivoire art. 15 Decision].
83 Id. (footnotes omitted).
84 Id.
85 Id. at 86 (citing Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-717, ¶ 394); Prosecutor v. Harun,
ICC-02/05-01/07, Decision on the Prosecution Application under Article 58(7) of the
Statute, ¶ 62 (Apr. 27, 2007); Tadic, supra note 45, at ¶ 648; Prosecutor v. Kordic, R
Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 94 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former
Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2004); Blas˘kic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, supra note 56, at ¶ 101; see R
also ICC, Coˆte d’Ivoire art. 15 Decision, supra note 82, at ¶ 54. R
86 Id. (original footnotes omitted).
87 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19, Decision Pursuant to art. 15
of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the
Republic of Kenya, ¶ 96 (Mar. 31, 2010) [hereinafter Kenya art. 15 Decision].
88 Id.
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embodies the existence of policy as an indispensable element of crimes
against humanity and not merely as an indicator of a systematic attack.89
As Cupido rightly highlighted, the inclusion of the policy element in the
ICC definition of crimes against humanity has not translated into its
“more prominent role . . . in the crimes against humanity concept” in the
ICC.90
Despite the use of the terms “widespread” and “systematic” in the
alternative, the ICC Prosecutor seems to presume that both requirements
must be present in order to seek the Pre-Trial Chamber’s authorization of
an investigation. Apart from the situation in Ukraine, there are only two
other situations before the ICC that have been solely based on the crimes
against humanity charges, namely post-election violence in Kenya and in
Coˆte d’Ivoire. However, in both instances at the stage of seeking the Pre-
Trial Chamber’s authorization of an investigation, the ICC Prosecutor
maintained that both the widespread and systematic requirements were
in place.91
In the situation of Coˆte d’Ivoire, the ICC Prosecutor alleged that there
was “a reasonable basis to believe” that the attack by the pro-Gbagbo
forces against the civilian population was both widespread and system-
atic.92 In support of this conclusion, the Prosecutor listed a number of
factual circumstances, such as the extended time period in which crimes
were carried out, from 28 November 2010 to May 2011, the large geo-
graphic range of the alleged crimes, and the high number of reported
victims.93 Interestingly, all the facts listed by the ICC Prosecutor to
demonstrate both the “widespread” and “systematic” attack are only
indicative of a widespread nature attack.94 The Prosecutor does not name
a single characteristic that demonstrates the systematic nature of the
attack, yet concludes that both characteristics of the attack are present.95
While the systematic dimension of the attack may in fact have been pre-
sent, the ICC Prosecutor did not articulate which factual circumstances
supported both characteristics of the attack. It does seem that the exis-
tence of the “widespread” requirement almost overrides the “systematic”
requirement. Although the Prosecutor is not obliged to prove both char-
acteristics of the attack, as the proof of one element is sufficient, it is
worrying that by clearly listing facts, which are only pertinent to the
89 Akayesu, supra note 51, at ¶ 580. R
90 Marjolein Cupido, The Policy Underlying Crimes Against Humanity: Practical
Reflections on a Theoretical Debate, 22 CRIM. L. FORUM 275, 296 (2011).
91 Kenya art. 15 Decision, supra note 87, at ¶ 100; ICC, Coˆte d’Ivoire art. 15 R
Decision, supra note 82, at ¶ 55. R
92 Coˆte d’Ivoire Article 15 Decision, supra note 82, at ¶ 55. R
93 Id. at ¶ 57-60, 62.
94 Id. at ¶ 55-62.
95 Id.
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“widespread” nature of the attack, the Prosecutor assumes that both
“widespread and systematic” characteristics are present.
Similarly, in the situation in Kenya, the ICC Prosecutor alleged that the
post-election violence occurred in the context of a “widespread and sys-
tematic” attack against the Kenyan civilian population when seeking the
Pre-Trial’s Chamber authorization for an investigation.96 According to
the Prosecutor, this was evidenced by “hundreds of incidents with varying
degrees of organization,”97 which comprised of attacks directed against
perceived supporters of the Party of National Unity by groups associated
with the Orange Democratic Movement, retaliatory attacks directed
against groups who initiated the violence, and attacks committed by the
police.98 In this instance the ICC Prosecutor points at the systematicity of
the attacks by not only noting the large scale of the attacks but also the
organization of parties that targeted groups they perceived as their oppo-
nents.99 However, the Pre-Trial Chamber exclusively focused on the
widespread rather than the systematic dimension of attacks.100 It con-
cluded that the attacks were widespread since they involved a large num-
ber of civilians.101 The judges referred to a high number of casualties,
approximately 1,220 deaths and 3,561 injured, in support of the wide-
spread nature of the attacks.102 On the basis of the casualties, the Pre-
Trial Chamber concluded that the evidence was supportive of the “wide-
spread” requirement103 and therefore refrained from examining whether
the “systematic” element was present, despite the Prosecutor’s allega-
tions on the existence of the “widespread and systematic” characteristics
of the attack.104 It is not entirely clear why the Pre-Trial Chamber did not
address the systematic dimension of crimes against humanity. On the one
hand, it was the Pre-Trial Chamber’s right to do so, since the proof of
only one characteristic of attacks was sufficient per se. On the other hand,
it might be that the Pre-Trial Chamber was not entirely convinced of the
“systematic” requirement to be met and therefore chose not to address
the Prosecutor’s allegations on the existence of such requirement.
As clear from above, the ICC firmly upholds the disjunctive test of a
“widespread or systematic” attack. However, in interpreting the require-
ment, the judges do not go beyond what has already been said by the ad
hoc tribunals. One the one hand, it shows that the definition of crimes
against humanity as it has evolved over the years of adjudication in inter-
96 Kenya art. 15 Decision, supra note 87, at ¶ 100. R
97 Id. at ¶ 101 (footnotes omitted).
98 Id. at ¶ 102-06.
99 Id. at ¶ 136-37.
100 Id. at ¶ 110-12.
101 Id. at ¶ 130.
102 Id. at ¶ 131.
103 Id. at ¶ 129-34.
104 Id. at ¶ 100.
\\jciprod01\productn\B\BIN\35-1\BIN102.txt unknown Seq: 17  7-FEB-17 12:59
2017] NO CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 55
national courts is solid. On the other hand, the judges do not shed light
on some less straightforward aspects of the definition of crimes against
humanity within the meaning of the Rome Statute, namely the relation-
ship between the policy element and the “widespread or systematic”
requirement.
So far judging by the jurisprudence of the ICC, it is unclear what fac-
tual circumstances indicate the systematicity of an attack in the context of
crimes against humanity. Some scholars suggest that the interpretation of
the “systematic” requirement offered by the ICC judges is synonymous
with its understanding of the policy element.105 As demonstrated above,
in the situation of Coˆte d’Ivoire, the Pre-Trial Chamber assumed the sys-
tematic dimension of the attacks was present, without engaging into the
discussion what factual circumstances were supportive of this require-
ment.106 In the situation of Kenya, the judges dismissed the Prosecution’s
submissions on the existence of a “systematic” attack notwithstanding its
earlier finding on the existence of an organizational policy, without offer-
ing any explanation what was the underlying rationale behind such con-
clusion.107 In this particular case, the judges missed an opportunity to
address the relationship between the requirement of an organizational
policy and a “systematic” characteristic of an attack. An important issue
regarding the relationship between those two elements will be addressed
in the next section of the Article.
B. Relationship Between the Policy Element and “Widespread or
Systematic” Requirement
For the purposes of our discussion below, it is necessary to analyze the
interplay between the “widespread or systematic” requirement and the
policy element in the context of crimes against humanity. The ad hoc
tribunals have not considered the existence of a plan or policy as a sepa-
rate element of the contextual elements of crimes against humanity, but
have treated it as an evidentiary issue, which was relevant to establish the
“widespread or systematic” nature of the attack.108 This treatment of the
policy element was greeted with a great degree of skepticism among lead-
ing academics who argue that the policy element is inherent to crimes
against humanity.109 Despite the voiced criticism in academia, the legal
105 See Cupido, supra note 90, at 291 (citing Matt Halling, Push the Envelope– R
Watch it Bend: Removing the Policy Requirement and Extending Crimes Against
Humanity, 23 Leiden J. INT’L L. 827, 836-37 (2010)).
106 Coˆte d’Ivoire art. 15 Decision, supra note 82, at ¶ 62. R
107 Kenya art. 15 Decision, supra note 87, at ¶ 135. R
108 Kunarac, supra note 59, ¶ 98. R
109 See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: HISTORICAL
EVOLUTION AND CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION 14 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2011);
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 112 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2011); William A. Schabas, Prosecuting Dr.
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finding of the Appeals Chamber in Kunarac on the treatment of a policy
plan as an evidentiary matter rather than a distinct element of crimes
against humanity has been approvingly cited in the subsequent jurispru-
dence of the ad hoc tribunals.110
Contrary to the statutory law and jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals,
the Rome Statute explicitly provides for a “state or organizational policy”
as a distinct element of crimes against humanity within an attack directed
against any civilian population. This means that the attack must be com-
mitted pursuant to or in furtherance of a “state or organizational policy”
to commit such attack. According to the ICC Elements of Crimes, “policy
to commit an attack” within the meaning of crimes against humanity shall
be understood as requiring that “the [s]tate or organization actively pro-
mote or encourage such an attack against the civilian population.”111 In
the absence of the developed jurisprudence on the interpretation of the
policy element, the ICC had to grapple with the issue and provide a sensi-
ble definition as to what constitutes the policy element.
In the early jurisprudence of the ICC in Katanga and Ngundjolo Chui
case, the Pre-Trial Chamber explained that a policy within the meaning of
the Rome Statute “may be made either by groups of persons who govern
a specific territory or by any organization with the capability to commit a
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.”112 The
ICC also made clear the policy does not have to be formalized or explic-
itly defined.113 The policy element as understood by the Pre-Trial Cham-
ber entails that “an attack which is planned, directed or organized – as
opposed to spontaneous or isolated acts of violence – will satisfy this cri-
terion.”114 The Pre-Trial Chamber endorsed the same interpretation of
the policy element as was provided in the situation of Kenya.115 The given
Strangelove, Goldfinger, and the Joker at the International Criminal Court: Closing the
Loopholes, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 847, 847 (2010). But see Guenael Mettraux, Crimes
Against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 237, 281 (2002).
110 See Prosecutor v. Naletilic, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment, ¶ 234 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31 2003); see also Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case
No. IT-98-32-T, Judgment, ¶ 36 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29,
2002); see also SCHABAS, supra note 109, at 112. R
111 INT’L CRIM. CT., ICC ELEMENTS OF CRIMES Art. 7(3) (Int’l Crim. Ct. 2011).
112 Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, Decision Pursuant to article 61(7)
and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre
Gombo, ¶ 81 (Jun. 15, 2009) (original footnotes omitted); Prosecutor v. Katanga,
ICC-01/04-01/07-717, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ¶ 396 (Sep. 30, 20018)
(original footnotes omitted)
113 Katanga, supra note 82, at ¶ 396. R
114 Bemba, supra note 112, at ¶ 81. R
115 See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 243 (Kluwer Academic Pub. 1992, 2d rev. ed. 1999); see also M.
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, 1 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
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definition of a policy element is sufficiently broad and emphasizes that
regardless of whether crimes are committed by a state or an organization
what matters is the capability of those actors to commit crimes that
affront universally protected human values. The Pre-Trial Chamber in the
situation of Coˆte d’Ivoire summarized the earlier ICC jurisprudence and
listed a number of elements demonstrating the existence of a policy: “(a)
it must be thoroughly organised and follow a regular pattern; b) it must
be conducted in furtherance of a common policy involving public or pri-
vate resources; c) it can be implemented either by groups who govern a
specific territory or by an organisation that has the capability to commit a
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population; and d) it
need not be explicitly defined or formalized.”116
It is clear from the definition of the policy element that it entails a
certain degree of planning and organization. An important question that
springs to mind is how the policy element interacts with the systematic
requirement, which also presupposes a certain level of organization. Aca-
demic literature describes the policy element as a low threshold test,
whereas it describes the systematic criterion as a higher threshold test.117
Does that mean that some sort of planning or organization conceived at
the state or organizational level is needed to prove the policy element,
while the proof of the systematic requirement would require demonstrat-
ing a higher degree of organization? It does seem that the policy require-
ment and “systematic” requirement have often been conflated in the
jurisprudence. No clear guidance has been given thus far as to how those
two elements interrelate. Although, as mentioned above, the existence of
a policy or plan serves a completely different purpose in the ad hoc tribu-
nals in comparison to the ICC, it is confusing that the ICC pre-trial cham-
bers repeatedly refer to the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals that
interpret “systematic” requirement through the existence of a policy.
Likewise, the involvement of public or private resources in furtherance of
a common policy is viewed as an indicator of the “systematic” attack in
the ad hoc tribunals,118 while the same element in the ICC is used to
demonstrate the existence of a policy. Given that the existence of a policy
has been elevated to a separate legal element in the ICC, it would be
beneficial if the ICC judges provided more guidance as how the policy
COURT: INTRODUCTION, ANALYSIS, AND INTEGRATED TEXT OF THE STATUTE,
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 151-52 (Transnat’l
Pub. 2005); see also Kenya Article 15 Decision, supra note 87, at ¶ 86 (stating that the R
majority interpretation of the organizational policy stands in contrast to the opinion
of Professor Bassiouni who was engaged in drafting the Rome Statute and construed
the reference to “organizational policy” as an expression of the policy of a state).
116 Coˆte d’Ivoire Article 15 Decision, supra note 82, at ¶ 43. R
117 Robinson, supra note 63, at 51. R
118 See Akayesu, supra note 51, at ¶ 580; see also Blas˘kic, supra note 58, at ¶ 203. R
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element should be construed and how it interrelates with the requirement
of a “systematic” attack.
So far, the discussion on the policy element, introduced in the ICC, has
dwelled on the definition of the organizational policy element, which is
considered by many practitioners and academics broad enough to capture
crimes that were not intended to be included within the scope of the ICC
jurisdiction.119 The issue on the interrelation between the policy require-
ment and “systematic” requirement has not yet been widely debated, but
it has become more relevant in light of the latest ICC Prosecutor’s deci-
sion not to proceed with the situation in Ukraine when the Prosecutor
concluded that the systematic dimension of the attack was absent, not-
withstanding the existence of a state policy to commit such attack, which
should have been viewed at least as an indicator of the systemacity of
attacks.120
The next section of this article examines the applicability of a “wide-
spread or systematic” requirement with respect to the Maydan crimes.
The author argues that the ICC Prosecutor’s finding on the absence of
crimes against humanity during the Maydan protests stems from the lack
of a clear understanding in International Criminal Law as to how the sys-
tematic dimension of an attack should be understood on a stand-alone
basis and how it interacts with the policy element.
IV. PROSECUTOR’S DECISION NOT TO PROCEED IN THE ABSENCE OF
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY DURING
THE MAYDAN PROTESTS
Following the preliminary examination of the crimes against humanity
allegations with respect to the Maydan crimes, the ICC Prosecutor con-
cluded that there is not a reasonable basis to believe that the crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court were committed.121 In reaching her
decision whether a “reasonable basis” exists for initiating an investiga-
tion, the ICC Prosecutor is guided by Article 53(1) of the Rome Statute.
It establishes a set of criteria that the ICC Prosecutor shall consider, in
particular whether: (a) the information available to the Prosecutor pro-
119 See WILLIAM SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE 152 (Oxford Univ. Press 2010); see also
Charles Chernor Jalloh, What Makes a Crime Against Humanity a Crime Against
Humanity?, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 381, 436 (2013); see also Claus Kress, On the
Outer Limit of Crimes Against Humanity: The Concept of Organization Within: the
Policy Requirement: Some Reflections on the March 2010 ICC Kenya Decision, 23
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 855, 873 (2010); see also Kenya Article 15 Decision, supra note 87, R
at ¶ 52 (Hans-Peter Kaul, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Majority definition would
technically cover all kinds of criminal gangs with fluctuating membership that engage
in serious and organized crimes).
120 OTP REPORT, supra note 21, at ¶ 99-100. R
121 Id. at  ¶ 95-101.
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vides a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of
the Court has been or is being committed; (b) the case is or would be
inadmissible under Article 17 of the Statute; and (c) taking into account
the gravity of the crime and the interests of justice, there are nonetheless
substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the
interests of justice.122 Given the Prosecutor’s finding that the requirement
laid down in Article 53(1)(a) was not fulfilled, the Prosecutor did not
examine the remaining two prerequisites for evaluating whether to initi-
ate an investigation.123
As mentioned above, the declaration accepting the ad hoc jurisdiction
of the ICC alleged criminal responsibility of the Ukrainian highest politi-
cal leadership for crimes against humanity.124 In assessing the situation,
the ICC Prosecutor examined whether the factual circumstances were
supportive of the allegations of crimes against humanity.125 More specifi-
cally, the ICC Prosecutor analyzed whether the contextual elements of
crimes against humanity were in place by looking into: (1) whether the
alleged crimes constituted an attack against the civilian population, (2)
whether there existed a state of organizational policy to carry out such
attack, and (3) whether the alleged attack was widespread or
systematic.126
At the outset, the ICC Prosecutor established that the Ukrainian secur-
ity forces used “excessive and indiscriminate force” against protesters
who took to the streets to express their dissent with the former govern-
ment and journalists who covered the events.127 Further to this, the ICC
Prosecutor acknowledged that during the three months of demonstra-
tions, protesters and other individuals were killed as well as subjected to
ill-treatment, including torture and other inhumane acts, by members of
Ukrainian law enforcement agencies as well as the pro-government group
of civilians, commonly known as titushky, who provided support to law
enforcement during demonstrations.128 The report continues that the
Ukrainian security forces and titushky targeted individuals on the basis of
their opposition to the former government of beleaguered President
Viktor Yanukovych.129 This led the ICC Prosecutor to conclude that the
violent acts against protesters unleashed by the Ukrainian security forces
122 Rome Statute, supra note 22, at art. 53. R
123 OTP REPORT, supra note 21, ¶ 77-110. R
124 Declaration I, supra note 18. R
125 OTP REPORT, supra note 21, ¶ 89. R
126 OTP REPORT, supra note 21, at ¶ 89-100. R
127 Id. at ¶ 90.
128 Id. (defining “titushky” as “pro-government group of civilians who coordinated
with, and provided support to, law enforcement during public order operations”).
129 Id.
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and titushky satisfy the requirement of article 7 of the Rome Statute of
“an attack to be directed against a civilian population.”130
Following this, the Prosecutor recognized that the acts of violence were
not random, but formed part of a campaign or operation against the
Maydan protesters.131 Moreover, the Prosecutor maintained that the acts
of violence followed a regular pattern in terms of their characteristics and
nature, the population targeted, the alleged perpetrators and locations,
which were mainly the sites of demonstrations.132 The existence of a state
policy to attack the civilian population during the protests was inferred
from a number of factual circumstances, among others, (1) “coordination
of, and cooperation with, anti-Maydan citizen volunteers”; (2) the “con-
sistent failure of state authorities to take any meaningful of effective
action to prevent the repetition of incidents of violence”; and (3) “the
apparent efforts to conceal or cover the alleged crimes.”133 On the basis
of this information and at the backdrop of a political situation in Ukraine,
the Prosecutor concluded that the acts of the Ukrainian security forces
and titushky were carried out pursuant to or in furtherance of a state
policy aimed at suppressing the Maydan protest movement.134
Subsequently, the ICC Prosecutor proceeded to evaluate whether any
attack directed against the civilian population was widespread or system-
atic in nature. She ruled out the widespread nature of the attack noting
“the alleged attack was limited in its intensity and geographic scope.”135
In support of this finding, the Prosecutor referred to a number of factual
circumstances, stating that “the alleged crimes were committed almost
exclusively in the context of a limited number of clashes and confronta-
tions between security forces and protesters,” during the three-month
period and “the majority of the alleged crimes occurred in a limited geo-
graphic area within the city of Kyiv, particularly in and around Maydan
Nezalezhnosti.”136 The Prosecutor also looked at the number of individu-
als killed and injured during the protests, and concluded that the cumula-
tive effect of the killing of at least seventy-five civilians and the injury of
more than 700 protesters rendered it questionable the existence of the
widespread nature of the alleged crimes against humanity.137
Having ruled out the widespread characteristic of the attack, the Prose-
cutor examined whether the evidence supported the conclusion of the
systematic nature of the attack within the meaning of crimes against
130 Id. at ¶ 90.
131 Id. at ¶ 92.
132 OTP REPORT, supra note 21, at ¶ 92. R
133 Id. at ¶ 93.
134 Id.
135 Id. at ¶ 96.
136 Id.
137 Id. at ¶ 97 (stating that some injuries were far less serious in nature and,
therefore, did not constitute underlying acts of crimes against humanity).
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humanity.138 The report concluded that the systematic dimension of
crimes against humanity was missing, given that the alleged crimes did
“not necessarily appear to have been carried out in a consistent, organ-
ized manner or on a regular or continual basis.”139 The report empha-
sized that “the alleged crimes occurred in an infrequent and often more
reactive manner, determined by the different circumstances as events
developed during the demonstrations.”140 Although the ICC Prosecutor
acknowledged the unjustified and disproportionate nature of the attack
against protesters, she nevertheless concluded that the alleged acts fall
short of meeting the systematic criterion of crimes against humanity as
they were “aimed to limit the protests rather than being part of a deliber-
ate, coordinated plan of violence methodically carried out against the
protest movement,”141 and appear to have “occurred only sporadically, in
limited instances.”142
V. DECISION ANALYSIS
The decision analysis is confined to the Prosecutor’s evaluation of a
“widespread or systematic” requirement that led the Prosecutor to con-
clude that there was no supporting evidence to demonstrate the proof of
such requirement and thus no crimes against humanity occurred during
the Maydan protests. The analysis of the Prosecutor’s evaluation of a
“widespread or systematic” criterion is important, as it lays ground for
the subsequent applicability of the law on crimes against humanity in the
ICC.
In its assessment of a widespread characteristic, the Prosecutor paid
attention to the geographical distribution of crimes and a number of casu-
alties. One can concur with the Prosecutor’s finding that that the alleged
crimes were predominantly perpetrated in Kyiv where the protests took
place. Although the protests were also commonplace in other regions of
Ukraine, the alleged crimes were geographically concentrated at the
heart of Kyiv.143 If one compares the situation in Ukraine with the situa-
tion in Coˆte d’Ivoire, the crimes were more geographically spread out in
Coˆte d’Ivoire.144 Likewise, crimes against humanity were scattered across
various regions in Kenya.145
An interesting issue is the ICC Prosecutor’s interpretation of a number
of casualties, which, in her opinion, was insufficient to demonstrate the
138 Id. at ¶ 98.
139 OTP REPORT, supra note 21, at ¶ 98. R
140 Id. at ¶ 99.
141 Id.
142 Id. at ¶ 100.
143 Id. at ¶ 92.
144 Coˆte d’Ivoire art. 15 Decision, supra note 82, at ¶ 105 (stating that the crimes R
were committed in Duekoue and other towns in the west of the Coˆte d’Ivoire).
145 See Kenya art. 15 Decision, supra note 87, at ¶ 129-34. R
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widespread dimension of an attack. However, there is no minimum
numerical threshold in International Criminal Law that is required to
prove that the attack within the context of crimes against humanity was
widespread. Casting a look at the two other situations, in which crimes
against humanity were alleged before the ICC, it becomes clear that the
number of casualties was substantially higher than in the situation of
Ukraine during the Maydan protests. As an example, post-election vio-
lence in Kenya reportedly caused between 1,133 and 1,220 deaths and
3,561 individuals injured.146 In the situation of Coˆte d’Ivoire, the Pre-Trial
Chamber referred to the reports of Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch that provided an account of the killings of hundreds of civil-
ians.147 The official UN figures show that more than 1,000 persons were
killed during the post-election violence in the Coˆte d’Ivoire.148 These
figures are higher than the number of victims during the Maydan
protests.
The ICC Prosecutor’s decision not to recognize the widespread dimen-
sion of the alleged crimes against humanity appears to be in line with its
developed practice. However, it raises an interesting issue as to the mini-
mum numerical threshold of crimes that would be sufficient to demon-
strate the widespread dimension of attack(s) within the context of crimes
against humanity. As pointed out by the Pre-Trial Chamber before, the
assessment as to whether the attack is widespread is “neither exclusively
quantitative nor geographical,” as it must be based on the evaluation of
individual facts.149 It has been repeatedly upheld in the jurisprudence of
international criminal courts that a widespread attack may be “the cumu-
lative effect of a series of inhumane acts or the singular effect of an inhu-
mane act of extraordinary magnitude.”150 Technically speaking, there is
nothing in the jurisprudence of international criminal courts suggesting
that the number of victims who were killed and injured during the
Maydan protests in Ukraine does not meet the widespread requirement.
However, despite the absence of a numerical threshold, the developed
practice in the ICC suggests that the “widespread” requirement would
not be met unless the number of persons killed in the context of crimes
against humanity exceeded 1,000 and the crimes were geographically
scattered.
The Prosecutor’s finding on the absence of a systematic attack is more
controversial. It is at odds with the Prosecutor’s earlier finding on the
existence of a deliberate State policy to suppress the Maydan protests. If
146 Id. at ¶ 131.
147 Coˆte d’Ivoire art. 15 Decision, supra note 82, at ¶ 103, 105. R
148 Death Toll in Ivorian Postelection Violence Surpassed 1,000, UN (May 26,
2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=38522#.VcDGJvOqpBc (last
visited 1 March 2016).
149 Kenya art. 15 Decision, supra note 87, at ¶ 95. R
150 Id.; see also Blas˘kic, supra note 85, at ¶ 101, Kordic, supra note 85, at ¶ 94. R
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one were to follow the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals that is
repeatedly cited by the ICC, one would at least treat the existence of a
policy element as an indicator of a “widespread or systematic attack” in
the context of crimes against humanity. However, despite the existence of
such policy, the ICC Prosecutor concluded that she had limited informa-
tion at her disposal to support the finding that the alleged attack carried
out in the context of the Maydan protests was systematic.151 Of course,
the proof of a policy element alone does not automatically translate into
the systematic requirement of crimes against humanity; however, it is an
important indicator of the systematicity, which seems to have been
neglected in the Prosecutor’s analysis of the systematic requirement.
As demonstrated by the discussion above, it is not yet clear from the
still developing ICC jurisprudence how the policy element and a “wide-
spread or systematic” requirement interrelate. In the ICTY, the proof of
a “widespread or systematic” requirement was treated as demonstrating a
policy, whether formalized or not.152 Hence, it is logical to assume that
the existence of a policy must at least be viewed as an indicator of a
“widespread or systematic” attack. It also brings us to the question of
what is the core of a crime against humanity, i.e. the presence of a state or
organizational policy or the widespread or systematic dimension of an
attack directed against the civilian population?153 The historical evolution
of crimes against humanity shows that the involvement of a state in the
commission of crimes directed against its own population makes it nearly
impossible to domestically prosecute those crimes, indicating the inter-
vention of international courts is warranted in such situations. In the situ-
ation in Ukraine, the implication of the Ukrainian political leadership in
authorizing the crimes against its own population serves as a clear indica-
tor of a “systematic” attack. However, the ICC Prosecutor did not adopt
this view and dismissed the existence of a systematic requirement.
On the one hand, in her analysis of the policy element, the Prosecutor
acknowledges “the acts of violence do not appear to be mere aggregate of
random acts.”154 On the other hand, in her discussion on the systematic
requirement, the Prosecutor submits that “the alleged crimes do not nec-
essarily appear to have been carried out in a consistent, organized man-
ner or on regular or continual basis.”155 It is somehow paradoxical to
conclude that acts of violence, which involved security forces killing over
seventy-five individuals and injuring over 700 at the peak of violence in
151 OTP REPORT, supra note 21, at ¶ 98, 101. R
152 Tadic, supra note 45, at ¶ 653 (stating that “[i]f the acts occur on a widespread R
or systematic basis that demonstrates a policy to commit those acts, whether
formalized or not”).
153 See Jalloh, supra note 119, at 385 (posing similar questions on crimes against R
humanity).
154 OTP REPORT, supra note 21, at ¶ 92. R
155 Id. at ¶ 98.
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February, were carried out in a completely unorganized and inconsistent
manner.156 Such a high number of casualties by the security forces and
titushky acting on orders from the Ukrainian senior officials hardly seems
to be unorganized. The targeting of the protesters was a conscious choice
of the perpetrators since they were sure of their impunity for the crimes
they had committed given the backing of the Ukrainian political
leadership.
Moreover, apart from the existence of a state or organizational policy,
there exist other indicators of the systematic dimension of the attacks that
could be inferred from the developed jurisprudence of international
courts. The attacks were not random but thoroughly organized, which is
evidenced by a high degree of organization of the Ukrainian security
forces and titushky who coordinated in quelling the protests. There
existed a clear pattern of behavior pursued by the Ukrainian security
forces and titushky in terms of characteristics, the targeted population,
the alleged perpetrators and location. The Ukrainian senior officials con-
doned the crimes by failing to take any meaningful steps to ensure
responsibility of the culprits of crimes.
The implication of high-level political authorities is also indicative of
the systematic dimension of the attack. In the aftermath of the Maydan
protests, on the basis of the available evidence, the Ukrainian Prosecutor
General Office (“PGO”) initiated a number of cases against the most
senior Ukrainian officials, including the former President of Ukraine,
Viktor Yanukovych, and the former Minister of Interior Affairs, Vitaliy
Zakharchenko.157 With respect to the willful killings and intentional
infliction of serious bodily harm against protesters that were common-
place in January and February 2014, the PGO issued indictments on the
charges of aggravated murder under Article 115(2) of the Criminal Code
of Ukraine against senior public officials, including both Yanukovych and
Zakharchenko.158 The former General Prosecutor of Ukraine, Viktor
Pshonka, was also charged with abuse of power that entails serious conse-
quences under Article 364(2) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.159 The
charges levied against the high-ranking Ukrainian politicians do not com-
prise crimes against humanity since the Ukrainian Criminal Code does
not penalize this category of international crimes.
Despite the initiation of cases against the most senior Ukrainian offi-
cials accused of directing the Maydan crimes, none of them have been
156 OTP REPORT, supra note 21, at ¶ 97. R
157 Register of Proceedings of Crimes During the Revolution of Dignity,
PROSECUTOR GENERAL’S OFFICE OF UKRAINE, http://rrg.gp.gov.ua/reestr-kriminalnih
-provadzhen/golovne-slidche-upravlinnja-generalnoi-prokuraturi-ukraini/storinka-1/
(last visited Mar. 1, 2016).
158 Id. (providing an account of national criminal proceedings with respect to the
Maydan crimes).
159 Id.
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successfully prosecuted since the suspects have absconded justice and,
according to media reports, fled to neighboring Russia. According to the
Ukrainian Ministry of Interior figures, over 400 extradition requests sent
to Russia were left unanswered.160 Although the ICC Prosecutor is not
bound by the findings of the PGO and other public information with
respect to the identification of suspects who were responsible for orches-
trating the Maydan crimes, the available information demonstrates the
implication of the Ukrainian senior officials in the commission of crimes
and indicates the systematic dimension of the attack directed against the
Maydan protesters. A slow pace of criminal proceedings, inability to
obtain the suspects in the custody of the Court, the very absence of the
criminalization of crimes against humanity in the Criminal Code of
Ukraine, and the involvement of the top political leadership in the com-
mission of crimes highlight the importance of the Ukraine’s declaration
that accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC and viewed it as a last resort to
address the Maydan crimes.
Another characteristic of the systematic dimension of the attack is the
commitment of substantial public and private resources by the Ukrainian
authorities to quell the public protests. Despite this criterion being
viewed as an indicator of a policy requirement in the ICC, it has been
consistently viewed by the ad hoc tribunals as demonstrating the sys-
temacity of attacks. It has been documented that around 11,000 law
enforcement officers and hundreds of titushky were deployed in Kyiv on
public order duties during the period of Maydan protests and hundreds of
titushky.161 According to the PGO preliminary investigation, hundreds of
titushky were organized, paid and armed by the Minister of Interior, and
were involved in kidnapping, assaulting and killing of the protesters.162
Whereas the employment of the security forces was carried out to contain
the Maydan protests, it is clear that they did not feel restrained and felt
authorized to use violence against the protesters. Contrary to the Prose-
cutor’s statement that there did not exist a consistent pattern that demon-
strated “Ukrainian security forces seeking out and attacking or violently
targeting participants in the Maydan protest movement,”163 the CoE
investigative panel documents that, at the peak of violence, Berkut
officers within the period of one hour and a half hour shot forty-nine
persons dead and inflicted firearm injuries on ninety persons.164 Two days
before, eight persons were killed and more that 1,000 were injured during
the Maydan protests.165
160 International Advisory Panel on its Review of the Maidan Investigations,
Council of Eur., ¶. 404 (Mar. 21, 2015) [hereinafter CoE Report].
161 Id. at ¶ 88, 402.
162 CoE Report, supra note 160, at ¶ 292. R
163 OTP REPORT, supra note 21, at ¶ 98-99. R
164 CoE Report, supra note 160, at ¶ 84. R
165 Id. at ¶ 71.
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The existence of a state policy to suppress the Maydan protests that
resulted in the violence against the protesters coupled with the: (1) level
of the organization of the attacks, (2) the existence of a regular pattern of
behavior demonstrated by the Ukrainian security forces and titushky, (3)
repeated and continuous commission of crimes directed against the
protesters who opposed the former government, (3) condoning of crimes
by the Ukrainian political leadership and failure to sanction the commis-
sion of crimes, (4) implication of high-level political leaders in the com-
mission of crimes, and (5) involvement of substantial public and private
resources to quell the Maydan protests are all indicative of the systematic
dimension of attack, which the ICC Prosecutor overlooked in her evalua-
tion of the Maydan crimes.
It is also worth mentioning that at this preliminary stage of seeking the
Pre-Trial Chamber’s authorization to initiate an investigation, the ICC
Prosecutor applied an unreasonably high evidentiary standard. The rea-
sonable basis standard, which must be proved at this stage, is the lowest
evidentiary threshold that must be demonstrated by the Prosecutor in
order for the judges to authorize the initiation of an investigation into a
specific situation. The information available to the Prosecutor, which is
submitted to the Pre-Trial Chamber, need not be “comprehensive” or
“conclusive” of the alleged crimes at the preliminary stage.166 In other
words, at the preliminary stage, it is only necessary for the Pre-Trial
Chamber to arrive at the conclusion that “a sensible or reasonable justifi-
cation for a belief” that the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court
have been committed exists.167 By deciding not to seek the Pre-Trial
Chamber’s authorization and terminating its inquiry into the Maydan
crimes, the ICC Prosecutor has stripped the judges of the opportunity to
elaborate further on the interpretation of the “widespread or systematic”
requirement and its relationship with the policy element.
Having narrowly focused on the evaluation of the contextual elements
of crimes against humanity, the ICC Prosecutor has also overlooked the
gravity of the crimes and the interests of justice. The crimes had a devas-
tating effect on the surviving family members of the protesters who were
killed for their dissent with the former government and left an indelible
mark on the entire community that struggle to come to terms with the
fact that the violent crimes took place in a peaceful country in the midst
of public protests. No justice has been delivered in the aftermath of the
Maydan crimes. Turning a blind eye to the Maydan crimes reinstates the
impunity of top political leadership for unleashing violence against its
own nationals. Following the ICC Prosecutor’s decision, the Ukrainian
government submitted that it would provide further evidence supportive
of the crimes against humanity allegations. Whereas it is uncertain
whether additional evidence provided by Ukraine would make the ICC
166 Kenya art. 15 Decision, supra note 87, at ¶ 27, 24. R
167 Id. at ¶ 27-35.
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Prosecutor change her mind with respect to the initial evaluation of the
Maydan crimes, the Prosecutor has to yet to make determination on the
second declaration lodged by Ukraine that deals with the crimes associ-
ated with the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and ongo-
ing armed conflict in eastern Ukraine.168
VI. CONCLUDING WORDS
This Article takes a fresh look at the definition of crimes against
humanity and its applicability in the ICC by analyzing the ICC Prosecu-
tor’s decision not to proceed with the investigation of the Maydan crimes
in Ukraine, based on her evaluation of the “widespread or systematic”
requirement. The author argues that the ICC Prosecutor did not correctly
apply the systematic requirement of crimes against humanity to the fac-
tual circumstances surrounding the Maydan events that were supportive
of the requirement. The ICC Prosecutor’s finding appears to stem from
the lack of clarity in International Criminal Law as to how the systematic
requirement is applied on a stand-alone basis as well as how it interacts
with the policy element. The uncertainty as to the interaction between
those two elements is particularly noticeable in the context of the ICC. It
is rooted in the fact that the Rome Statute treats the existence of a policy
as an indispensable element of crimes against humanity contrary to the ad
hoc tribunals that have considered it as an evidentiary matter indicative
of the systematicity of an attack. Although the ICC judges have
attempted to breathe life into the definition of a policy element, they
have thus far limited their discussion to what constitutes an “organiza-
tional policy.” As for the interpretation of a “widespread or systematic”
requirement of crimes against humanity, the ICC judges have repeatedly
and uncritically cited the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, without
engaging in the discussion on how the policy element and a “widespread
or systematic” requirement interact. The golden opportunity to address
such interaction was missed when the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber in the situ-
ation of Kenya confirmed the existence of an organizational policy, but
failed to address the ICC Prosecutor’s submissions that the attacks were
also systematic after it had earlier established the widespread nature of
attacks. In the situation of Ukraine, the ICC Prosecutor denied the judges
an opportunity to decide whether the Maydan crimes would satisfy the
systematic requirement of crimes against humanity despite its earlier
finding on the existence of a State policy, which serves as an important
indicator of the systematic requirement.
In its narrow interpretation of the “widespread or systematic” require-
ment, the Prosecutor missed the bigger picture and overlooked the inter-
ests of justice in reaching its decision not to move forward with the
investigation. The decision is regrettable in many aspects. First, the Prose-
168 Declaration II, supra note 16. R
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cutor applied a very stringent interpretation of the systematic require-
ment in the context of crimes against humanity. This may be due to the
absence of any practice where the ICC Prosecutor decided to seek the
Pre-Trial Chamber’s authorization of an investigation on the basis of the
existence of a systematic requirement on a stand-alone basis.  Second, the
Prosecutor seems to have undermined the seriousness of the situation
evidenced by the involvement of the Ukrainian top political leadership
who were behind the crimes and did absolutely nothing to stop the crimes
against the protesters. Despite the initiation of a number of criminal cases
by PGO, it proved impossible to apprehend the high-level accused and
initiate credible prosecutions of the Maydan crimes. Third, the impact of
the crimes on the surviving family members and the entire country is dif-
ficult to underestimate, since the majority of those who were killed were
young university students who strived for a better democratic future for
their country.  Due to the public deficit of trust in the Ukrainian public
prosecutor’s office, which is marred by widespread corruption claims, the
ICC intervention would be enormously valuable.
Following the ICC Prosecutor’s decision, the Ukrainian government
announced that it would provide further evidence supportive of the
crimes against humanity allegations. Whereas it is uncertain whether
additional evidence provided by Ukraine would make the ICC Prosecu-
tor change her mind with respect to the initial evaluation of the Maydan
crimes, the Prosecutor has to yet to make determination on the second
declaration lodged by Ukraine that deals with the crimes associated with
the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and ongoing armed
conflict in eastern Ukraine.169 In this instance, there will be no leeway to
deny war crimes and crimes against humanity that have been widely doc-
umented by international NGOs and Ukrainian authorities.170
169 Id.
170 For an in-depth discussion of legal issues linked to the second declaration
lodged by Ukraine to the ICC see Marchuk, supra note 14, at 360-69. R
